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Abstract. Congestion games constitute an important class of non-cooperative games which
was introduced by Rosenthal in 1973. In recent years, several extensions of these games were
proposed to incorporate aspects that are not captured by the standard model. Examples of such
extensions include the incorporation of risk sensitive players, the modeling of altruistic player
behavior and the imposition of taxes on the resources. These extensions were studied intensively
with the goal to obtain a precise understanding of the inefficiency of equilibria of these games.
In this paper, we introduce a new model of congestion games that captures these extensions
(and additional ones) in a unifying way. The key idea here is to parameterize both the perceived
cost of each player and the social cost function of the system designer. Intuitively, each player
perceives the load induced by the other players by an extent of ρ ≥ 0, while the system designer
estimates that each player perceives the load of all others by an extent of σ ≥ 0. The above
mentioned extensions reduce to special cases of our model by choosing the parameters ρ and σ
accordingly. As in most related works, we concentrate on congestion games with affine latency
functions here.
Despite the fact that we deal with a more general class of congestion games, we manage to
derive tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability for a large range of pa-
rameters. Our bounds provide a complete picture of the inefficiency of equilibria for these
perception-parameterized congestion games. As a result, we obtain tight bounds on the price
of anarchy and the price of stability for the above mentioned extensions. Our results also reveal
how one should “design” the cost functions of the players in order to reduce the price of anar-
chy. Somewhat counterintuitively, if each player cares about all other players to the extent of
0.625 only (instead of 1 in the standard setting) the price of anarchy reduces from 2.5 to 2.155
and this is best possible.
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1 Introduction
Congestion games constitute an important class of non-cooperative games which was introduced
by Rosenthal in 1973 [13]. In a congestion game, we are given a set of resource from which a set
of players can choose. Each resource is associated with a cost function which specifies the cost of
this resource depending on the total number of players using it. Every player chooses a subset of
resources (from a set of resource subsets available to her) and experiences a cost equal to the sum of
the costs of the chosen resources. Congestion games are both theoretically appealing and practically
relevant. For example, they have applications in network routing, resource allocation and scheduling
problems.
Rosenthal [13] proved that every congestion game has a pure Nash equilibrium, i.e., a strategy
profile such that no player can decrease her cost by unilaterally deviating to another feasible set
of resources. This result was established through the use of an exact potential function (known as
Rosenthal potential) satisfying that the cost difference induced by a unilateral player deviation is
equal to the potential difference of the respective strategy profiles. In fact, Monderer and Shapley
[11] showed that the class of games admitting an exact potential function is isomorphic to the class
of congestion games.
One of the main research directions in algorithmic game theory focusses on quantifying the
inefficiency caused by selfish behavior. The idea is to assess the quality of a Nash equilibrium relative
to an optimal outcome. Here the quality of an outcome is measured in terms of a given social cost
objective (e.g., the sum of the costs of all players). Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [10] introduced
the price of anarchy as the ratio between the worst social cost of a Nash equilibrium and the social
cost of an optimum. Anshelevich et al. [1] defined the price of stability as the ratio between the best
social cost of a Nash equilibrium and the social cost of an optimum.
In recent years, several extensions of Rosenthal’s congestion games were proposed to incorporate
aspects which are not captured by the standard model. For example, these extensions include risk
sensitivity of players in uncertain settings [12], altruistic player behavior [4,5] and congestion games
with taxes [3,14]. We elaborate in more detail on these extensions in Section 2. These games were
studied intensively with the goal to obtain a precise understanding of the price of anarchy.
In this paper, we introduce a new model of congestion games, which we term perception-
parameterized congestion games, that captures all these extensions (and more) in a unifying way.
The key idea here is to parameterize both the perceived cost of each player and the social cost func-
tion. Intuitively, each player perceives the load induced by the other players by an extent of ρ ≥ 0,
while the system designer estimates that each player perceives the load of all others by an extent
of σ ≥ 0. The above mentioned extensions reduce to special cases of our model by choosing the
parameters ρ and σ accordingly.
Despite the fact that we deal with a more general class of congestion games, we manage to
derive tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability for a large range of parame-
ters. Our bounds provide a complete picture of the inefficiency of equilibria for these perception-
parameterized congestion games. As a consequence, we obtain tight bounds on the price of anarchy
and the price of stability for the above mentioned extensions. While the price of anarchy bounds are
(mostly) known from previous results, the price of stability results are new. As in [3,4,5,12,14], we
focus here on congestion games with affine cost functions.3
We illustrate our model by means of a simple example; formal definitions of our perception-
parameterized congestion games are given in Section 2. Suppose we are given a set of m resources
and that every player has to choose precisely one of these resources. The cost of a resource e ∈ [m]4
is given by a cost function ce that maps the load on e to a real value. In the classical setting, the
load of a resource e is defined as the total number of players xe using e. That is, the cost that player
i experiences when choosing resource e is ce(xe). In contrast, in our setting players have different
perceptions of the load induced by the other players. More precisely, the perceived load of player i
choosing resource e is 1+ρ(xe−1), where ρ ≥ 0 is a parameter. Consequently, the perceived cost
of player i for choosing e is ce(1+ρ(xe−1)). Note that as ρ increases players care more about the
3 Conceptually, our model can easily be adapted to more general latency functions; only the derivation of the
respective bounds is analytically much more involved.
4 Given a positive integer m, we use [m] to refer to the set {1, . . . ,m}.
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Model Parameters PoA Reference
Classical ρ = σ = 1 5/2 [6]
Altruism (1) σ = 1, 1≤ ρ ≤ 2 (4ρ+1)/(1+ρ) [4,5]
Altruism (2) σ = 1, 2≤ ρ ≤ ∞ ρ+1 [5]
Uncertainty: risk neutral-players σ = ρ = 1/2 5/3 [12]
Uncertainty: Wald’s minimax principle σ = 1/2, ρ = 1 2 [2,12]
Constant universal taxes σ = 1, ρ = h(1). 2.155 [3]
Generalized affine congestion games − ∞ [∗]
Model Parameters PoS Reference
Classical ρ = σ = 1 1.577 [3]
Altruism (1) σ = 1, 1≤ ρ ≤ 2 (√3+1)/(√3+ρ−1) [∗]
Uncertainty: risk neutral-players σ = ρ = 1/2 1.447 [∗]
Uncertainty: Wald’s minimax principle σ = 1/2, ρ = 1 1 [∗]
Constant universal taxes σ = 1, ρ = h(1) 2.013 [∗]
Generalized affine congestion games − 2 [∗]
Table 1. An overview of (tight) price of anarchy and price of stability results for certain values of ρ and σ . Here
h(1)≈ 0.625 (see Theorem 1 for a formal definition). An asterisk indicates that this result is new.
presence of other players.5 In addition, we introduce a similar parameter σ ≥ 0 for the social cost
objective. Intuitively, this can be seen as the system designer’s estimate of how each player perceives
the load of the other players. In our example, the social cost is defined as ∑e∈[m] ce(1+σ(xe−1))xe.
Our Results. In Section 3, we prove a bound of
max
{
ρ+1,
2ρ(1+σ)+1
ρ+1
}
(1)
on the price of anarchy of affine congestion games for a large range or parameters (ρ,σ) (see also
Figure 1 for an illustration). For general affine congestion games we prove that this bound is tight.
Further, even for the special case of symmetric network congestion games we show that the bound
(2ρ(1+σ)+1)/(ρ+1) is asymptotically tight (on the range for which it is attained).
In Section 4, we give a bound of √
σ(σ +2)+σ√
σ(σ +2)+ρ−σ (2)
on the price of stability of affine congestion games for a large range or pairs (ρ,σ) (see below
for details). For general affine congestion games we show that this bound is tight. For symmetric
network congestion games we give a better (tight) bound on the price of stability for the case σ = 1
and ρ ≥ 0 arbitrary (details are given in Section 5).
An overview of the price of anarchy and the price of stability results that we obtain from (1)
and (2) for several applications known in the literature is given in Table 1. The respective references
where these bounds were established first are given in the rightmost column. The connection between
these applications and our model is discussed in detail at the end of Section 2.
In light of the above bounds, we obtain an (almost) complete picture of the inefficiency of equi-
libria (parameterized by ρ and σ ); for example, see Figure 3 for an illustration of the price of anarchy
if σ = 1. Note that the price of anarchy decreases from 52 for ρ = 1 to 2.155 for ρ = h(1)≈ 0.625.6
We refer the reader to Section 5 for further remarks and discussions of the results.
5 In general, the parameter ρ can be player- or resource-specific, but in this work we concentrate on the
homogenous case (i.e., all players have the same perception parameter).
6 The price of anarchy for ρ = h(1) was first established by Caragiannis et al. [3]. However, our bounds reveal
that the price of anarchy is infact minimized at ρ = h(1) (see also Figure 3).
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2 Our Model, Applications and Related Work
We first formally introduce our model of congestion games with parameterized perceptions. We then
show that our model subsumes several other models that were studied in the literature as special
cases.
Congestion Games. A congestion game Γ is given by a tuple (N,E,(Si)i∈N ,(ce)e∈E) where N = [n]
is the set of players, E the set of resources (or facilities), Si ⊆ 2E the set of strategies of player i, and
ce : R≥0 → R≥0 the cost function of facility e. Given a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . ,sn) ∈ ×iSi, we
define xe as the number of players using resource e, i.e., xe = xe(s) = |{i ∈ N : e ∈ si}|. If Si = S j for
all i, j∈N, the game is called symmetric. For a given graph G=(V,E), we callΓ a (directed) network
congestion game if for every player i there exist si, ti ∈V such that Si is the set of all (directed) (si, ti)-
paths in G. An affine congestion game has cost functions of the form ce(x) = aex+be with ae,be ≥ 0.
If be = 0 for all e ∈ E, the game is called linear.
Our Model. We introduce our unifying model of perception-parameterized congestion games with
affine latency functions. For a fixed parameter ρ ≥ 0, we define the cost of player i ∈ N by
Cρi (s) = ∑
e∈si
ce(1+ρ(xe−1)) = ae[1+ρ(xe−1)]+be (3)
for a given strategy profile s = (s1, . . . ,sn). For a fixed parameter σ ≥ 0, the social cost of a strategy
profile s is given by
Cσ (s) =∑
i
Cσi (s) = ∑
e∈E
xe(ae[1+σ(xe−1)]+be). (4)
We refer to the case ρ = σ = 1 as the classical congestion game with cost functions ce(x) = aex+be
for all e ∈ E.
Inefficiency of Equilibria. A strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium if for all players i ∈ N it holds
that Cρi (s) ≤Cρi (s′i,s−i) for all s′i ∈ Si, where (s′i,s−i) denotes the strategy profile in which player i
plays s′i and all the other players their strategy in s. The price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability
(PoS) of a game Γ are defined as
PoA(Γ ,ρ,σ) =
maxs∈NE Cσ (s)
mins∗∈×iSi Cσ (s∗)
and PoS(Γ ,ρ,σ) =
mins∈NE Cσ (s)
mins∗∈×iSi Cσ (s∗)
,
where NE = NE(ρ) denotes the set of Nash equilibria with respect to the player costs as de-
fined in (3). For a collection of games H we define PoA(H,ρ,σ) = supΓ∈HPoA(Γ ,ρ,σ) and
PoS(H,ρ,σ) = supΓ∈HPoS(Γ ,ρ,σ). Rosenthal [13] shows that classical congestion games (i.e.,
ρ = σ = 1) have an exact potential function: Φ :×iSi→ R is an exact potential function for a con-
gestion game Γ if for every strategy profile s, for every i ∈ N and every s′i ∈ Si: Φ(s)−Φ(s−i,s′i) =
Ci(s)−Ci(s−i,s′i). The Rosenthal potential Φ(s) =∑e∈E ∑xek=1 ce(k) is an exact potential function for
classical congestion games.
Applications. We review various models that fall within, or are related to, the framework proposed
above (for certain values of ρ and σ ). These models sometimes interpret the parameters differently
than explained above.
Altruism [4,5]. We can rewrite the cost of player i as
Cρi (s) = ∑
e∈si
(aexe+be)+(ρ−1)ae(xe−1).
The term (ρ − 1)ae(xe− 1) can be interpreted as a “dynamic” (meaning load-dependent) tax that
players using resource e have to pay.7 For 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ∞ and σ = 1, this model is equivalent to the
altruistic player setting proposed by Caragiannis et al. [4]. Chen et al. [5] also study this model of
7 In fact, for ρ = 2 this corresponds to the dynamic taxes as proposed in a technical report by Singh [14].
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altruism for 1 ≤ ρ ≤ 2 and σ = 1. (The equivalence between the altruistic model and our model is
proved in Lemma 3 in the appendix.)
Constant taxes [3]. We can rewrite the cost of player i as
Cρi (s) = ∑
e∈si
ρaexe+(1−ρ)ae+be.
Now a strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium if for every player i and every s′i ∈ Si
∑
e∈si
ρaexe+(1−ρ)ae+be ≤ ∑
e∈si∩s′i
ρaexe+(1−ρ)ae+be+ ∑
e∈s′i\si
ρae(xe+1)+(1−ρ)ae+be.
Dividing by ρ gives that s is also a Nash equilibrium for the cost functions
T ρi (s) = ∑
e∈si
aexe+
be
ρ
+∑
e∈si
1−ρ
ρ
ae.
That is, s is a Nash equilibrium in a classical congestion game in which players take into account
constant resource taxes of the form (1− ρ)/ρ · ae. Caragiannis, Kaklamanis and Kanellopoulos
[3] study this type of taxes, which they call universal tax functions, for ρ satisfying (1− ρ)/ρ =
3/2
√
3− 2. They consider these taxes to be refundable, i.e., they are not taken into account in the
social cost, which is equivalent to the case σ = 1. Note that the function τ : (0,1]→ [0,∞) defined
by τ(ρ) = (1−ρ)/ρ is bijective.8
Risk sensitivity under uncertainty [12]. Nikolova, Piliouras and Shamma [12] consider conges-
tion games in which there is a (non-deterministic) order of the players on every resource. A player
is only affected by players in front of her. That is, the load on resource e for player i in a strict order-
ing r, where re(i) denotes the position of player i, is given by xe(i) = |{ j ∈ N : re( j) ≤ re(i)}|. The
cost of player i is then Ci(s) = ∑e∈si ce(xe(i)). Note that xe(i) is a random variable if the ordering is
non-deterministic. The social cost of the model is defined by the sum of all player costs,
C
1
2 (s) = ∑
e∈E
ae
xe(xe+1)
2
+be
which is independent of the ordering r. (This holds because in every ordering there is always one
player first, one player second, and so on.) Note that the social cost corresponds to the case σ = 12
in our framework. Nikolova et al. [12] study various risk attitudes towards the ordering r that is
assumed to have a uniform distribution over all possible orderings. The two relevant attitudes are
that of risk-neutral players and players applying Wald’s minimax principle. Risk-neutral players
define their cost as the expected cost under the ordering r, which correspond to the case ρ = 12 in
(3). This can roughly be interpreted as that players expect to be scheduled in the middle on average.
Wald’s minimax principle implies that players assume a worst-case scenario, i.e., being scheduled
last on all the resources. This corresponds to the case ρ = 1.
Approximate Nash equilibria [7]. Suppose that s is a Nash equilibrium under the cost functions
defined in (3). Then, in particular, we have
C1i (s)≤Cρi (s)≤Cρi (s′i,s−i)≤ ρC1i (s′i,s−i)
for any player i and s′i ∈ Si and ρ ≥ 1. That is, we have C1i (s)≤ ρ ·C1i (s′i,s−i) which means that the
strategy profile s is a ρ-approximate equilibrium, as studied by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Spi-
rakis [7]. In particular, this implies that any upper bound on the price of anarchy, or price of stability,
in our framework yields an upper bound on the price of stability for ρ-approximate equilibria for the
same class of games.
Generalized affine congestion games. Let A′ denote the class of all congestion games Γ for
which all resources have the same cost function c(x) = ax+b, where a= a(Γ ) and b= b(Γ ) satisfy
a≥ 0 and a+b> 0. The class of affine congestion games with non-negative coefficients is contained
8 This relation between altruism (or spite) and constant taxes is also mentioned by Caragiannis et al. [4].
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ρ
ρ = σ
ρ = 2σ
ρ = h(σ)
ρ+1
2ρ(1+σ)+1
ρ+1
?
Fig. 1. The bound ρ + 1 holds for ρ ≥ 2σ ≥ 1. The bound (2ρ(1+σ)+ 1)/(1+ ρ) holds for σ ≤ ρ ≤ 2σ .
Roughly speaking, this bound also holds for h(σ) ≤ ρ ≤ σ , but our proof of Theorem 1 only works for a
discretized range of σ (hence the vertical dotted lines in this area). The function h is given in Theorem 1.
in A′ since every such game can always be transformed9 into a game Γ ′ with ae = 1 and be = 0 for
all resources e ∈ E ′, where E ′ is the resource set of Γ ′. Without loss of generality we can assume
that a+ b = 1, since the cost functions can be scaled by 1/(a+ b). The cost functions of Γ ∈ A′
can then equivalently be written as c(x) = ρx+(1−ρ) for ρ ≥ 0. This is precisely the definition of
Cρi (s) (with ae = 1 and be = 0 taken there). In particular, if we take σ = ρ , meaning that C
ρ(s) =
∑i∈N C
ρ
i (s), we have
PoA(A′) = sup
ρ≥0
PoA(A,ρ,ρ) and PoS(A′) = sup
ρ≥0
PoS(A,ρ,ρ),
where A denotes the class of affine congestion games with non-negative coefficients.
Due to page limitations some material is omitted from the main text below and can be found in the
appendix.
3 Price of Anarchy
In this section we derive an upper bound on the price of anarchy for affine congestion games of
max
{
ρ+1,
2ρ(1+σ)+1
ρ+1
}
for a wide range of pairs (ρ,σ) that captures all known (to us) price of anarchy results in the liter-
ature that fall within our model. We show that this bound is tight for general congestion games. We
also show that the bound (2ρ(1+σ)+ 1)/(ρ + 1) is (asymptotically) tight for symmetric network
congestion games, for the range of (ρ,σ) on which it is attained.
We need the following technical result for the proof of the main result in Theorem 1:
Lemma 1. Let s be a Nash equilibrium under the cost functions Cρi (s) and let s
∗ be a minimizer of
Cσ (·). For ρ,σ ≥ 0 fixed, if there exist α(ρ,σ),β (ρ,σ)≥ 0 such that
(1+ρ · x)y−ρ(x−1)x− x≤−β (ρ,σ)(1+σ(x−1))x+α(ρ,σ)(1+σ(y−1))y
for all non-negative integers x and y, then β (ρ,σ)Cσ (s)≤ α(ρ,σ)Cσ (s∗).
Theorem 1. Let s be a Nash equilibrium under the cost functions Cρi (s) and let s
∗ be a minimizer of
Cσ (·). Then
Cσ (s)
Cσ (s∗)
≤ 2ρ(1+σ)+1
ρ+1
(5)
9 This transformation can be done in such a way that both PoA and PoS of the game do not change. For a proof
the reader is referred to, e.g., [5, Lemma 4.3].
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i) if 12 ≤ σ ≤ ρ ≤ 2σ ,
ii) if σ = 1 and h(σ)≤ ρ ≤ 2σ ,
where h(σ) = g(1+σ +
√
σ(σ +2),σ) is the optimum of the function
g(a,σ) =
σ(a2−1)
(1+σ)a2− (2σ +1)a+2σ(σ +1) .
Furthermore, there exists a function ∆ = ∆(σ) (specified in the appendix) satisfying for every fixed
σ0 ≥ 1/2: if ∆(σ0)≥ 0, then (5) is true for all h(σ0)≤ ρ ≤ 2σ0.
Proof (Sketch). For the functions α(ρ,σ) = (2ρ(1+σ)+1)/(1+2σ) and β (ρ,σ) = (1+ρ)/(1+
2σ), we prove the inequality in Lemma 1. We show that, for certain functions f1 and f2, the smallest
ρ satisfying the inequality of Lemma 1 is given by the quantity
h(σ) = sup
x,y∈N: f1(x,y,σ)>0
− f2(x,y,σ)
f1(x,y,σ)
.
We divide the set (x,y) ∈ N×N in lines of the form x = ay and determine the supremum over every
line. After that we take the supremum over all lines, which then gives the desired result. We first
show that the case x≤ y which is trivial. We then focus on y > x. In this case we want to determine
h(σ) = sup
a∈R>1
sup
y>1
− f2(ay,y,σ)
f1(ay,y,σ)
.
We show that h(σ) = max{γ1(σ),γ2(σ)} for certain functions γ1 and γ2. Numerical experiments
suggest that ∆(σ) := γ1(σ)−γ2(σ)≥ 0, that is, the maximum is always attained for γ1 (which is the
definition of h given in the statement of the theorem). In particular, this means that if, for a fixed σ ,
the non-negativity of ∆(σ) is checked, then the proof indeed yields the inequality of Lemma 1 for
h(σ)≤ ρ ≤ 2σ . uunionsq
Numerical experiments suggest that ∆(σ) is non-negative for all σ ≥ 1/2. We emphasize that
for a fixed σ , with ∆(σ) ≥ 0, the proof that the inequality holds for all h(σ) ≤ ρ ≤ 2σ is exact in
the parameter ρ . The first two cases of Theorem 1 capture all the price of anarchy results from the
literature.
We next show that the bound of Theorem 1 is also an (asymptotic) lower bound for linear sym-
metric network congestion games.10 This improves a result in the risk-uncertainty model of Piliouras
et al. [12], who only prove asymptotic tightness for symmetric linear congestion games (for their re-
spective values of ρ and σ ). It also improves a result in the altruism model by Chen et al. [5], who
show tightness only for general congestion games. The proof is a generalization of the construction
of Correa et al. [8], who proved that for the classical case ρ = σ = 1, the Price of Anarchy upper
bound of 5/2, shown in [6], is asymptotically tight for symmetric network congestion games.
Theorem 2. For ρ,σ > 0 fixed, and players with cost functions Cρi (s), there exist symmetric network
linear congestion games such that
Cσ (s)
Cσ (s∗)
≥ 2ρ(1+σ)+1
ρ+1
− ε
for any ε > 0, where s is a Nash equilibrium, and s∗ a socially optimal strategy profile.
Proof. We construct a symmetric network linear congestion game with n players. We first describe
the graph topology used in the proof of Theorem 5 in [8] (using similar notation and terminology).
The graph G consists of n principal disjoint paths, called P1, . . . ,Pn from s to t (horizontal paths in
Figure 2), each consisting 2n−1 arcs (and hence 2n nodes). With ei, j the j-th arc on path i is denoted
for i = 1, . . . ,n and j = 1, . . . ,2n− 1. Also, vi, j denotes the j-th node on path i for i = 1, . . . ,n and
j = 1, . . . ,2n. There are also n(n−1) connecting arcs: for every path i there is an arc (vi,2k+1,vi−1,2k)
6
s t
(1+ρ)x
ρx x ρx x ρx x ρx
(1+ρ)x
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
v1 w1
v2
w2
Fig. 2. Illustration of the instance for n= 5. The dashed (blue) path indicates the strategy of player 2 in the Nash
equilibrium. For every principal path, the first and last arc have cost (1+ρ)x, and in between the costs alternate
between ρx and x (starting and ending with ρx). The diagonal connecting arcs have cost zero. The numbers at
the bottom indicate the layers. The bold (red) subpaths indicate the two deviation situations that are analyzed to
prove that s is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
for k = 1, . . . ,n− 1, where i− 1 is taken modulo n (the diagonal arcs in Figure 2). For j ≥ 1 fixed,
we say that the arcs ei, j for i = 1, . . . ,n form the ( j−1)-th layer of G (see Figure 2).
The cost functions are as follows. All arcs leaving s (the arcs ei,1 for i = 1, . . . ,n) and all arcs
entering t (the arcs ei,2n for i = 1, . . . ,n) have latency ce(x) = (1+ρ)x. For all i = 1, . . . ,n, the arcs
ei,2k−1 for k = 1, . . . ,n−1 have cost function ce(x) = ρx, whereas the arcs ei,2k for k = 1, . . . ,n−2
have cost function ce(x) = x. All other arcs (the diagonal connecting arcs) have cost zero.
The feasible strategy profile t in which player i uses principal path Pi, for all i= 1, . . . ,n has social
cost Cσ (t) = n(2(1+ρ)+ (n− 1)ρ +(n− 2)) = n((1+ρ)n+ρ). A Nash equilibrium is given by
the strategy profile in which every player k uses the following path: she starts with arcs ek,1 and
ek,2, then uses all arcs of the form ek+ j,2 j,ek+ j,2 j+1,ek+ j,2 j+2 for j = 1, . . . ,n−1, and ends with arcs
ek+n−1,2n−2,ek+n−1,2n−1 (and uses all connecting arcs in between).11 Note that all the (principal) arcs
of layer j have load 1 is j is even, and load 2 if j is odd. The social cost of this profile is given by
Cσ (s) = n(2(1+ρ)+(n−1) ·2 ·ρ(1+σ(2−1))+n−2) = n((1+2ρ(1+σ))n−2ρσ). It follows
that Cσ (s)/Cσ (t) ↑ (1+ 2ρ(1+σ))/(1+ ρ) as n→ ∞. We now show that the above mentioned
strategy profile s is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
Fix some player, say player 2, as in Figure 2, and suppose that this player deviates to some path
Q. Let j be the first layer in which P2 and Q overlap. Note that j must be odd. The cost C
ρ
2 (s) of
player 2, on the subpath of P2 leading to the first overlapping arc with Q, is at most
(1+ρ)+
j−1
2
· [2 · [ρ(1+ρ(2−1))]+1]+ρ(1+ρ(2−1)) = (1+ρ)2+ j−1
2
(1+2ρ(1+ρ))
The subpath of Q leading to the first overlapping arc with P2 has C
ρ
i (Q,s−i) as follows. She uses at
least one arc in every odd layer (before the overlapping layer) with a load of 3 and one arc of every
even layer (before the overlapping arc) with load 2, meaning that the cost of player i on the subpath
of Q is at least
(1+ρ)(1+ρ(2−1))+ j−1
2
·[(ρ(1+ρ(3−1)))+(1+ρ(2−1))]= (1+ρ)2+ j−1
2
·(2ρ+1)(1+ρ)
Since 1+2ρ(1+ρ)< (2ρ+1)(1+ρ) for all ρ ≥ 0, if follows that the cost of player i on the subpath
of P2 is no worse than that of the subpath of Q, when player 2 deviates from P2 to Q. If follows that
it suffices to show that P2 is an equilibrium strategy in s with respect to deviations Q that overlap on
the first arc e2,1 with P2. A similar argument shows that it also suffices to look at deviations Q for
which Q and P2 overlap on the last arc e2,2n−1 of P2.
10 In the appendix (Theorem 8) we show (non-asymptotic) tightness for general congestion games.
11 This is similar to the construction in Theorem 5 [8].
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Now suppose that P2 and Q do not overlap on some internal part of P2. Note that the first arc of
Q that is not contained in P2, say (v1,w1) must be in an even layer, and also that the last arc, say
(v2,w2) (which is a connecting arc) is in an odd layer (note that v1 6= s and w2 6= t w.l.o.g. by what is
said in the previous paragraph). It is not hard to see that the subpath of Q from v1 to w2 contains the
same number of even-layered arcs as the subpath of P2, and the same number of odd-layered arcs
as the subpath of P2. However, the load on all the odd-layered arcs on the subpath of deviation Q is
3, whereas the load on odd-layered arcs in the subpath of P2 between v1 and w2 (in strategy s) is 2.
Similarly, the load on every even-layered arc on the subpath of deviation Q is 2, whereas the load on
ever even-layered arc in the subpath of P2 is 1. Hence the subpath of deviation Q between v1 and w2
can never be profitable. uunionsq
For ρ ≥ 2σ , we can obtain a tight bound of ρ+1 on the price of anarchy. Remarkably, the bound
itself does not depend on σ , only the range of ρ and σ for which it holds. For the parameters σ = 1
and ρ ≥ 2 in the altruism model of Caragiannis et al. [4], this bound is known to be tight for non-
symmetric singleton congestion games (where all strategies consist of a single resource). We only
provide tightness for general congestion games, but the construction is significantly simpler.
Theorem 3. Let s be a Nash equilibrium under the cost functions Cρi (s) and let s
∗ be a minimizer of
Cσ (·). Then Cσ (s)/Cσ (s∗)≤ ρ+1 for 1≤ 2σ ≤ ρ . Furthermore, this bound is tight.
4 Price of Stability
In this section we give a tight bound for the price of stability of√
σ(σ +2)+σ√
σ(σ +2)+ρ−σ
for a large range of pairs (ρ,σ). We show this bound to be (asymptotically) tight.
We need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 2. For all non-negative integers x and y, and σ ≥ 0 arbitrary, we have(
x− y+ 1
2
)2
− 1
4
+2σx(x−1)+(
√
σ(σ +2)+σ)[y(y−1)− x(x−1)]≥ 0.
Theorem 4. Let s be a best Nash equilibrium under the cost functions Cρi (s) and let s
∗ be a mini-
mizer of Cσ (·). We have
Cσ (s)
Cσ (s∗)
≤
√
σ(σ +2)+σ√
σ(σ +2)+ρ−σ
for all σ > 0 and
2σ
1+σ +
√
σ(σ +2)
≤ ρ ≤ 2σ .
An overview of the implications of this bound is given in Table 1. The bound of 2 for generalized
affine congestion games requires some additional arguments (see appendix).
Proof. Our proof is similar to a technique of Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Spirakis [7] for upper
bounding the price of stability of ρ-approximate equilibria (we elaborate on the conceptual differ-
ence in Section 5). However, for a general σ the analysis is more involved. The main technical
contribution comes from establishing the inequality in Lemma 2.
We can write Cρi (s) = aexe+be+(ρ−1)aexe, which, by Rosenthal [13], implies that
Φρ(s) := ∑
e∈E
ae
xe(xe+1)
2
+bexe+(ρ−1)∑
e∈E
ae
(xe−1)xe
2
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is an exact potential for Cρi (s).
The idea of the proof is to combine the Nash inequalities, and the fact that the global minimum
of Φρ(·) is a Nash equilibrium (because it is an exact potential). Let s denote the global minimum
of Φρ , and s∗ a socially optimal solution. We can without loss of generality assume that ae = 1 and
be = 0. The Nash inequalities (as in the price of anarchy analysis) yield
∑
e∈E
xe(1+ρ(xe−1))≤ ∑
e∈E
(1+ρxe)x∗e
whereas the fact that s is a global optimum of Φρ(·) yields Φρ(s)≤Φρ(s∗), which reduces to
∑
e∈E
ρx2e +(2−ρ)xe ≤ ∑
e∈E
ρ(x∗e)
2+(2−ρ)x∗e .
If we can find γ,δ ≥ 0, and some K ≥ 1, for which(
0≤ ) γ [ρ(x∗e)2+(2−ρ)x∗e −ρx2e− (2−ρ)xe]+δ [(1+ρxe)x∗e− xe(1+ρ(xe−1)]
≤ K · x∗e [1+σ(x∗e−1)]− xe[1+σ(xe−1)], (6)
then this implies that Cσ (s)/Cσ (s∗)≤ K. We take
δ =
K−1
ρ
and γ =
(ρ−1)K+1
2ρ
.
It is not hard to see that δ ≥ 0 always holds, however, for γ we have to be more careful. We will
later verify for which combinations of ρ and σ the parameter γ is indeed non-negative. Rewriting
the expression in (6) yields that we have to find K satisfying
K ≥ f2(xe,x
∗
e ,σ)
f1(xe,x∗e ,ρ,σ)
:=
(x∗e)2−2xex∗e +(1+2σ)x2e− x∗e +(1−2σ)xe
[(1−ρ+2σ)(x∗e)2−2xex∗e +(1+ρ)x2e +(ρ−1−2σ)x∗e− (ρ−1)xe]
.
Note that this reasoning is only correct if f1(xe,x∗e ,ρ,σ)≥ 0. This is true since
f1(xe,x∗e ,ρ,σ) =
(
xe− x∗e +
1
2
)2
− 1
4
+(2σ −ρ)x∗e(x∗e−1)+ρxe(xe−1)
which is non-negative for all xe,x∗e ∈ N, σ ≥ 0 and 0≤ ρ ≤ 2σ . Furthermore, the expression is zero
if and only if (xe,x∗e) ∈ {(0,1),(1,1)}, but for these pairs the nominator is also zero, and hence, the
expression in (6) is therefore satisfied for those pairs. We can write
f2(xe,x∗e ,σ) =
(
xe− x∗e +
1
2
)2
− 1
4
+2σxe(xe−1)
and therefore f2/ f1 = AA+(2σ−ρ)B , where
A =
(
xe− x∗e +
1
2
)2
− 1
4
+2σxe(xe−1), B = x∗e(x∗e−1)− xe(xe−1).
Note that if ρ = 2σ , we have f2/ f1 = 1, and hence we can take K = 1. Otherwise,
A
A+(2σ −ρ)B ≤
√
σ(σ +2)+σ√
σ(σ +2)+ρ−σ =: K ⇔ A+(
√
σ(σ +2)+σ)B≥ 0
The inequality on the right is true by Lemma 2.
To finish the proof, we determine the pairs (ρ,σ) for which the parameter γ is non-negative. This
holds if and only if
(ρ−1)K+1 = (ρ−1)
√
σ(σ +2)+σ√
σ(σ +2)+ρ−σ +1≥ 0.
Rewriting this yields the bound on ρ in the statement of the theorem. uunionsq
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In the next theorem we provide a lower bound on the price of stability for arbitrary non-negative
pairs (ρ,σ). The proof is similar to a construction of Christodoulou et al. [7] used to give a lower
bound on the price of stability for ρ-approximate equilibria. The key difference is to tune the param-
eters α,β in the proof with respect to the Nash definition based on the cost function Cρi (·), rather
than the ρ-approximate Nash definition.
Theorem 5. Let ρ,σ > 0 fixed, with ρ < 2σ , and ε > 0 arbitrary. Then there exists a linear con-
gestion game, with player cost functions Cρi (s), such that
Cσ (s)
Cσ (s∗)
≥
√
σ(σ +2)+σ√
σ(σ +2)+ρ−σ − ε.
Here, s is a best Nash equilibrium, and s∗ a social optimum.
Proof. We describe the construction of Theorem 9 [7] using similar notation. We have a game
of n = n1 + n2 players divided into two sets G1 and G2 with size resp. n1 and n2. Each player
i ∈ G1 has two strategies: Ai and Pi. The players in G2 have a unique strategy D. The strategy
profile A = (A1, . . . ,An1 ,D, . . . ,D) will be the unique Nash equilibrium, and the strategy profile
P = (P1, . . . ,Pn1 ,D, . . . ,D) will be the social optimum. We have three types of resources:
– n1 resources αi, i = 1, . . .n1, with cost function cαi(x) = αx. The resource αi only belongs to
strategy Pi.
– n1(n1− 1) resources12 βi j, i, j = 1, . . . ,n1 with i 6= j, with cost function cβi j(x) = βx. The re-
source βi j belongs only to strategies Ai and Pj.
– One resource γ with cost function cγ(x) = x, that belongs to Ai for i = 1, . . . ,n1 and to D.
The idea is to set the parameters α and β in such a way that A becomes the unique Nash equi-
librium. For any strategy profile s, there are k players playing strategy Ai and n1− k players playing
strategy Pi in the set G1, for some 0 ≤ k ≤ n1. By symmetry, it then suffices to look at profiles
Sk = (A1, . . . ,Ak,Pk+1, . . . ,Pn1 ,D, . . . ,D) for 0 ≤ k ≤ n1. Furthermore, the first k players playing Ai
all have the same cost, and also, the n1− k players playing Pi have the same cost. We can therefore
focus on the costs of player 1, denoted by CρA(k), and that of player n1, denoted by C
ρ
P(k). We have
CρA(k) = β (k−1)+β (1+ρ(2−1))(n1− k)+1+ρ(n2+ k−1)
= (β −β (1+ρ)+ρ)k+(−β +β (1+ρ)n1+1+ρ(n2−1))
= ρ(1−β ) · k+(1−β −ρ)+β (1+ρ)n1+ρn2
and
CρP(k) = α+β (n1−1− k)+β (1+ρ(2−1))k
= βρ · k+α+β (n1−1) (7)
We can set the parameters α and β such that CρA(k) =C
ρ
P(k−1), meaning that Sk is a Nash equilib-
rium for every k (we will create a unique Nash equilibrium in a moment), that is we take
ρ(1−β ) = βρ and (1−β −ρ)+β (1+ρ)n1+ρn2 = α+β (n1−1)−βρ
Note that the −βρ term on the far right of the second equation comes from the fact that we evaluate
CρP(·) in k− 1 (remember that k denotes the number of players playing strategy Ai, so if a player
would switch to Pi this number decreases by 1). Solving the left equation leads to β = 1/2. Inserting
this in the right equation, and solving for α , gives
α = ρ
(
n1
2
+n2− 12
)
+1.
12 The proof of Theorem 9 [7] contains a typo here: it says there are n(n−1) resources of this type, instead of
n1(n1−1).
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We emphasize that α,β > 0 for all ρ ≥ 0. In order to make A the unique Nash equilibrium, we can
slightly increase α such that we get CρA(k)<C
ρ
P(k−1) for all k (which means that Ai is a dominant
strategy for player i). Note that this increase in α can be arbitrary small. We have
Cσ (A)
Cσ (P)
=
n1
[
1+σ(n1+n2−1)+ 12 (n1−1)
]
+n2 [1+σ(n1+n2−1)]
n1
[
ρ( n1+12 +n2−1)+1+ 12 (n1−1)
]
+n2 [1+σ(n2−1)]
Inserting n2 = a ·n1 for some rational a > 0, and sending n1→ ∞ gives a lower bound of
f (a) =
2σ(1+a)2+1
ρ(1+2a)+1+2σa2
on the price of stability. Optimizing over a> 0 (this only works if ρ < 2σ ) gives a∗=− 12 +
√
1
4 +
1
2σ
and f (a∗) then yields the bound in the statement of the theorem. uunionsq
5 Remarks and Additional Insights
We discuss the results of Sections 3 and 4 for the applications mentioned in Section 2 and obtain
some additional application-specific insights and results. We conclude this section by showing that
the price of stability results are not tight for the special case of symmetric network congestion games
(as opposed to the price of anarchy results, which are tight for this class).
ρ0 h(1)≈ 0.625 1 2
PoA(Γ ,ρ,1)
ρ+1
4ρ+1
ρ+1
2.155
4
ρ(4−ρ)
Fig. 3. Lower bounds on the price of anarchy for σ = 1. The bounds (4ρ+1)/(ρ+1) and ρ+1 are also tight
upper bounds. The dotted horizontal line indicates the lower bound following from Theorem 3.7 [4]. The bound
4/(ρ(4− ρ)) is a lower bound for symmetric singleton congestion games proven in Theorem 7. For general
congestion games, a tight bound for PoA(Γ ,ρ,1) when 0 < ρ ≤ h(1) is still an open problem.
Altruism [4,5]. For σ = 1, we see that the resulting bound (4ρ + 1)/(ρ + 1) is increasing in
ρ . Especially in the context of altruism or taxes, this is not desirable. A natural question to ask is
therefore if there exist collections H for which the price of anarchy is non-increasing as a function
of ρ .
The next theorem gives a sufficient condition for a class of instances to have the property of
non-increasing price of anarchy, which can be interpreted as follows. For ρ = 2, it can be shown
that the social optimum becomes a Nash equilibrium under the player cost function Cρi (s), which
implies that the price of stability is 1. Nevertheless, it might happen that worse Nash equilibria arise
as well. The condition PoA(H,2,1) = 1 states that this does not happen, and even stronger, that all
Nash equilibria of the game for ρ = 2 become social optima (it is said that the social optimum is
strongly enforceable).
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Theorem 6. Let H be a collection of congestion games. If PoA(H,2,1) = 1, then PoA(H,ρ,1) is a
non-increasing function for 1≤ ρ ≤ 2.
In a technical report, Singh [14] shows that the social optimum is strongly enforceable for symmetric
network congestion games on series-parallel graphs. We can therefore conclude that the (altruistic)
price of anarchy will be a non-increasing function of ρ . This is a remarkable result since, to the
best of our knowledge, the classical price of anarchy is unknown (the best lower bound is given by
Fotakis [9]).
Constant taxes [3]. Caragiannis et al. [3] showed that the price of anarchy can be decreased to
2.155 by the usage of universal tax functions (see also Section 1 and Figure 3), which improves
significantly the classical bound of 2.5. However, the price of stability increases from 1.577 (for
classical games) to 2.013, for this specific set of tax functions. Furthermore, from Theorem 3.7 [3]
it follows that the price of anarchy can never be better than 2.155 for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ h(1). In Theorem 7
we even show that the price of anarchy goes to infinity as ρ → 0.
Risk sensitivity under uncertainty [12]. We do not only re-obtain the price of anarchy results
for risk-neutral players and players applying Wald’s minimax principle (worst-case players), but our
results also give a tight bound for any convex combination (in terms of player costs) of risk-neutral
and worst-case risk attitudes. Furthermore, we also obtain tight price of stability results for this
model.
Approximate Nash equilibria [7]. For σ = 1 and 1 ≤ ρ ≤ 2, we obtain a bound of (√3+
1)/(
√
3+ρ−1) on the price of stability. In particular, this also yields the same bound on the price
of stability for ρ-approximate equilibria. This bound was previously obtained by Christodoulou et
al. [7]. Conceptually our approach is different since we obtain correctness of the bound through the
observation that every Nash equilibrium in our framework yields an approximate equilibrium. In par-
ticular, this immediately yields a potential function that can be used to carry out the technical details
(namely the potential function that is exact for our congestion game). Nevertheless, the framework
of Christodoulou et al. [7] is somewhat more general and might be used to obtain a tight bound for
the price of stability of approximate equilibria (which is not known to the best of our knowledge).
5.1 Price of stability for symmetric network congestion games
The price of anarchy bound of (1+ 2ρ(1+ σ))/(1+ ρ) obtained in Section 3 is tight even for
symmetric network congestion games with linear cost functions, as was shown in Theorem 2. This
is not true for the price of stability, which we will show here for the case σ = 1.
Theorem 7. Let Γ be a linear symmetric network congestion game, then
PoS(Γ ,ρ,1)≤
4/(ρ(4−ρ)) if 0≤ ρ ≤ 14/(2+ρ) if 1≤ ρ ≤ 2
(2+ρ)/4 if 2≤ ρ < ∞
In particular, if Γ is a symmetric congestion game on an extenstion-parallel13 graph G, then the
upper bounds even hold for the price of anarchy. All bounds are tight.
For ρ ≥ 1, the bounds were previously shown by Caragiannis et al. [4] for the price of anarchy of
singleton symmetric congestion games (which can be modeled on an extension-parallel graph).
Since any Nash equilibrium under the player cost Cρi (·) is in particular a ρ-approximate Nash
equilibrium, we also obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. The price of stability for ρ-approximate equilibria, with 1≤ ρ ≤ 2, is upper bounded
by 4/(2+ρ) for linear symmetric network congestion games.
Acknowledgements. We thank the anonymous referees for useful comments and one referee in
particular for very detailed suggestions and pointing out important typos.
13 A graph G is extension parallel if it consists of either (i) a single edge, (ii) a single edge and an extension-
parallel graph composed in series, (iii) two extension-parallel graphs composed in parallel.
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A Omitted Material of Section 2
The following lemma shows the equivalence between dynamic taxes and altruistic players.
Lemma 3. For 1≤ ρ ≤ 2, a strategy profile s ∈ ×iSi is a Nash equilibrium under the cost
Cρi (s) = ∑
e∈si
ce(xe)+(ρ−1)∑
e∈si
(xe−1)[ce(xe)− ce(xe−1)]
if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium under the altruistic cost
Aρi (s) = (2−ρ)C0i (s)+(ρ−1)C0(s)
Proof. Let s be a Nash equilibrium under the perceived costs Aγi (s), and let s∗ be any other strategy
profile. Furthermore, define γ = ρ − 1. Leaving out all the resources that are not in the symmetric
difference14 of si and s∗i (for the social cost term), we find that the Nash condition is equivalent to
(1− γ) ∑
e∈si\s∗i
ce(xe)+ γ
 ∑
e∈si\s∗i
xece(xe)+ ∑
e∈s∗i \si
xece(xe)
 ≤ (1− γ) ∑
e∈s∗i \si
ce(xe+1)
+ γ ∑
e∈si\s∗i
(xe−1)ce(xe−1)
+ γ ∑
e∈s∗i \si
(xe+1)ce(xe+1)
which is equivalent to
∑
e∈si\s∗i
ce(xe)+γ ∑
e∈si\s∗i
(xe−1)[ce(xe)−ce(xe−1)]≤ ∑
e∈s∗i \si
ce(xe+1)+ γ ∑
e∈s∗i \si
xe[ce(xe+1)−ce(xe)]
which is equivalent to Cγi (s)≤Cγi (s−i,s∗i ) since the terms for e ∈ si∩ s∗i do not change. uunionsq
14 Resources used by at most on strategy.
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B Omitted Material of Section 3
Lemma 1. Let s be a Nash equilibrium under the cost functions Cρi (s) and let s
∗ be a minimizer of
Cσ (·). For ρ,σ ≥ 0 fixed, if there exist α(ρ,σ),β (ρ,σ)≥ 0 such that
(1+ρ · x)y−ρ(x−1)x− x≤−β (ρ,σ)(1+σ(x−1))x+α(ρ,σ)(1+σ(y−1))y
for all non-negative integers x and y, then
Cσ (s)
Cσ (s∗)
≤ α(ρ,σ)
β (ρ,σ)
.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that ae = 1 and be = 0. We then have
∑
i
Cρi (s) =∑
e
ρ(xe−1)xe+∑
e
xe
=∑
e
ρ[1−σ +σ ](xe−1)xe+ρxe−ρxe+∑
e
xe
= ρ∑
e
[1+σ(xe−1)]xe+ρ∑
e
(1−σ)(xe−1)xe− xe+∑
e
xe
= ρCσ (s)+ρ∑
e
(1−σ)(xe−1)xe+(1−ρ)∑
e
xe.
Rewriting this, we find
ρ ·Cσ (s) =∑
i
Cρi (s)+ρ(σ −1)∑
e
(xe−1)xe+(ρ−1)∑
e
xe
≤∑
i
Cρi (s
∗
i ,s−i)+ρ(σ −1)∑
e
(xe−1)xe+(ρ−1)∑
e
xe
≤∑
e
[1+ρ(xe−1+1)]x∗e +ρ(σ −1)∑
e
(xe−1)xe+(ρ−1)∑
e
xe
=∑
e
[1+ρxe]x∗e +ρ(σ −1)(xe−1)xe+(ρ−1)xe
=∑
e
[1+ρxe]x∗e +ρ[1+σ(xe−1)]xe−ρ(xe−1)xe− xe
=∑
e
[1+ρxe]x∗e−ρ(xe−1)xe− xe+ρCσ (s)
≤ −β (ρ,σ)Cσ (s)+α(ρ,σ)Cσ (s∗)+ρCσ (s)
Rearranging terms then gives the desired result. uunionsq
The following proposition is used in the proof of Theorem 1 below.
Proposition 1. For every (x,y) ∈ N2 \{(1,0)}, we have
f1(x,y,σ) = 2y(y−1)σ2+[x2+2y2−2xy− x]σ +[x2− xy+2(y− x)]≥ 0
for σ ≥ σ∗ = 1/2.
Proof. Note that 2y(y−1)≥ 0 for all y ∈ N. Furthermore,
x2+2y2−2xy− x = (x− y)2+ y2− x≥ (x− y)2+(y− x)≥ 0
for all (x,y) ∈ N2, using the fact that a2− a ≥ 0 for all a ∈ N. This means that f1(x,y,σ) is non-
decreasing, and hence it suffices to prove the statement for σ∗ = 1/2. We need to prove
1
2
y(y−1)+ 1
2
[x2+2y2−2xy− x]+ [x2− xy+2(y− x)]≥ 0,
or equivalent,
y(y−1)+ x2+2y2−2xy− x+2x2−2xy+4(y− x)≥ 0.
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Simplifying gives
3x2+3y2−4xy+3y−5x≥ 0
which is equivalent to
2(x− y)2+ x(x−5)+ y(y+3)≥ 0
and this last formulation is clearly true for all pair (x,y) with x ≥ 5. For x = 4, we find 2(4−
y)2− 4+ y(y+ 3) ≥ 0 which is clearly true for y ≥ 1, and for y = 0 in can be checked through
inspection. For x = 3, we find 2(3− y)2 − 6+ y(y+ 3) ≥ 0 which is clearly true for y ≥ 2. For
y ∈ {0,1}, it can be check through inspection. For x= 2, we find 2(2−y)2−6+y(y+3)≥ 0, which
is again clear for y ≥ 2, and for y ∈ {0,1} it can be check through inspection. For x = 1, we find
2(1− y)2−4+ y(y+3)≥ 0, which is clearly true for y≥ 1. For y = 0 the inequality does not hold,
but this is the case (x,y) = (1,0) that we do not consider. For x = 0, it is clearly true. uunionsq
Theorem 1. Let s be a Nash equilibrium under the cost functions Cρi (s) and let s
∗ be a minimizer of
Cσ (·). Then
Cσ (s)
Cσ (s∗)
≤ 2ρ(1+σ)+1
ρ+1
(8)
i) if 12 ≤ σ ≤ ρ ≤ 2σ ,
ii) if σ = 1 and h(σ)≤ ρ ≤ 2σ ,
where h(σ) = g(1+σ +
√
σ(σ +2),σ) is the optimum of the function
g(a,σ) =
σ(a2−1)
(1+σ)a2− (2σ +1)a+2σ(σ +1) .
Furthermore, there exists a function ∆ = ∆(σ) which the property that, for any fixed σ0 ≥ 1/2: if
∆(σ0)≥ 0, then (8) is true for all h(σ0)≤ ρ ≤ 2σ0 (the function ∆ can be found in the proof below).
Proof. We show the following inequality,
(1+ρ · x)y−ρ(x−1)x− x≤− 1+ρ
1+2σ
(1+σ(x−1))x+ 2ρ(1+σ)+1
1+2σ
(1+σ(y−1))y. (9)
Multiplying with (1+2σ) we obtain the equivalent formulation
(1+2σ) [(1+ρ · x)y−ρ(x−1)x− x]≤−(1+ρ)(1+σ(x−1))x+(2ρ(1+σ)+1)(1+σ(y−1))y
which we can rewrite to f1(x,y,σ)ρ+ f2(x,y,σ)≥ 0 where
f1(x,y,σ) = −(1+σ(x−1))x+2(1+σ)(1+σ(y−1))y+(1+2σ)((x−1)x− xy)
= 2y(y−1)σ2+(−(x−1)x+2(y−1)y+2y+2x(x−1)−2xy)σ
+ (−x+2y+(x−1)x− xy)
= 2y(y−1)σ2+[x2+2y2−2xy− x]σ +[x2− xy+2(y− x)]
and
f2(x,y,σ) = −(1+σ(x−1))x+(1+σ(y−1))y+(1+2σ)(x− y)
= σy(y−1)−σx(x−1)+2σ(x− y)
=
(
y2− x2+3(x− y))σ
We first consider the case (x,y) = (1,0), since then we do not have f1(x,y,σ) ≥ 0. Substituting the
values for x and y, we obtain
−ρ+2σ ≥ 0
which is true if and only if ρ ≤ 2σ .
Case i). For the pair (x,y) = (1,0), the inequality is true if and only if ρ ≤ 2σ . For all other pairs,
we have f1(x,y,σ)≥ 0, and hence
f1(x,y,σ)ρ+ f2(x,y,σ)≥ f1(x,y,σ)σ + f2(x,y,σ)
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meaning that is suffices to show that f1(x,y,σ)σ + f2(x,y,σ)≥ 0. After dividing by σ , we see that
this is equivalent to
2y(y−1)σ2+[x2+2y2−2xy− x]σ +[x2− xy+2(y− x)]+ (y2− x2+3(x− y))≥ 0
which is equivalent to
2y(y−1)σ2+[x2+2y2−2xy− x]σ +[y2− xy+(x− y)]≥ 0
Again, we see that the terms before σ2 and σ are non-negative for all x,y ∈ N (see proof of Propo-
sition 1), meaning that if the inequality holds for some σ∗, then it holds for all σ ≥ σ∗. We take
σ∗ = 1/2. Multiplying the resulting inequality with 2, we find
y(y−1)+ [x2+2y2−2xy− x]+2[y2− xy+(x− y)]≥ 0
which is equivalent to
x2+5y2−4xy−3y+ x≥ 0.
This can be rewritten as
(x−2y)2+ y(y−3)+ x≥ 0
which is clearly true for all y /∈ {1,2}. For y= 1, we find (x−2)2−2+x≥ 0. This is clearly true for
all x≥ 2. For x∈ {0,1}, it can be checked through inspection. For y= 2, we find (x−4)2−2+x≥ 0.
This is again clearly true for x≥ 2, and can be check through inspection for x ∈ {0,1}.
Case ii). Now let (x,y) ∈ N2 \ {(1,0)}, then f1(x,y,σ) ≥ 0 by Proposition 1, meaning that
f1(x,y,σ)ρ + f2(x,y,σ) is non-decreasing in ρ . From the proof of Proposition 1, it follows that
f1(x,y,σ) = 0 if and only if (x,y) ∈ {(1,1),(2,1)} (which can be seen by checking all the cases).
Note that this observation is independent of σ . For (x,y)∈{(1,1),(2,1)} it also holds that f2(x,y,σ)=
0, which implies that f1(x,y,σ)ρ+ f2(x,y,σ) = 0 for every ρ . Therefore, we can focus on pairs (x,y)
for which f1(x,y,σ)> 0. It follows that any ρ∗ for which
ρ∗ ≥ sup
x,y∈N: f1(x,y,σ)>0
− f2(x,y,σ)
f1(x,y,σ)
.
yields the inequality for all ρ ≥ ρ∗. It is not hard to see that this supremum is indeed finite, for
every fixed σ . It can be proved that f1(x,y,σ)ρ ′ + f2(x,y,σ) ≥ 0 holds for some large constant
ρ ′, which then serves as an upper bound on the supremum. For the pair (x,y) = (0,1), we find
− f2/ f1 = σ/(1+σ), but we will see later that the supremum on the other pairs obtained is larger
than σ/(1+σ).
Note that by now, we can focus on pairs in {(x,y) : x≥ 1,y≥ 2}, since for all other pairs we have
either proven the inequality or given − f2/ f1, that is, we are interested in
sup
{(x,y):x≥1,y≥2}
− f2(x,y,σ)
f1(x,y,σ)
. (10)
Note that f2(x,y,σ) =
(
y2−x2+3(x−y))σ = (x+y−3)(y−x)≥ 0 if y≥ x (using that x+y≥ 3 for
(x,y) ∈ {(x,y) : x≥ 1,y≥ 2}). Hence, if y≥ x, we have − f2/ f1 ≤ 0, so those pairs are not relevant
for the supremum (if it follows that the upper bound on the supremum for all other pairs is positive,
which we will indeed see later). Therefore, we can focus on pairs with y < x.
We substitute x = ay for some (rational) a > 1. Note that
sup
a∈R>1
sup
y≥2
− f2(ay,y,σ)
f1(ay,y,σ)
(11)
provides an upper bound on (10). We have
f1(ay,y,σ) = [(1+σ)a2− (2σ +1)a+2σ(σ +1)]y2− [(2+σ)a+2σ2−2]y
and
− f2(ay,y,σ) = [(a2−1)σ ]y2+[3(1−a)σ ]y
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We determine an upper bound on the expression
− f2(ay,y,σ)
f1(ay,y,σ)
=
[(a2−1)σ ]y2+[3(1−a)σ ]y
[(1+σ)a2− (2σ +1)a+2σ(σ +1)]y2− [(2+σ)a+2σ2−2]y
=
[(a2−1)σ ]y+[3(1−a)σ ]
[(1+σ)a2− (2σ +1)a+2σ(σ +1)]y− [(2+σ)a+2σ2−2]
=
αy+β
γy−δ (12)
for y≥ 2. Elementary calculus shows that the derivative with respect to y of (12) is given by−(αδ +
γβ )/(γy− δ )2, which means the expression in (12) is non-decreasing or non-increasing in y. We
have
αδ + γβ = (a2−1)σ [(2+σ)a+2σ2−2]+3(1−a)[(1+σ)a2− (2σ +1)a+2σ(1+σ)]
= (1−a)σ [−(1+a)((2+σ)a+2σ2−2)+3((1+σ)a2− (2σ +1)a+2σ(1+σ))]
= (1−a)σ [(3(1+σ)− (2+σ))a2+(2− (2+σ)−2σ2−3(2σ +1))a+2−2σ2+6σ(1+σ)]
= (1−a)σ [(2σ +1)a2− (2σ2+7σ +3)a+(4σ2+6σ +2)]
= (1−a)σ [(2σ +1)a2− (2σ +1)(σ +3)a+(2σ +1)(2σ +2)]
= (1−a)σ(1+2σ)[a2− (σ +3)a+(2σ +2)]
= (1−a)σ(1+2σ)
[(
a− σ +3
2
)2
− 1
4
(1−σ)2
]
(13)
Intermezzo. If we consider the function x2 = (αx1+β )/(γx1−δ ), we see it has vertical asymp-
tote at x∗1 = δ/γ . We claim that x
∗
1 < 2. Note that, since a > 1, we have δ > 0 for all σ ≥ 0. If γ < 0
then x∗1 < 0. If γ > 0, we claim that x
∗
1 < 2. This is equivalent to showing that
(2+σ)a+2σ2−2 < 2(1+σ)a2−2(2σ +1)a+4σ(σ +1),
which holds if and only if
2(1+σ)a2−(5σ+4)a+2(1+σ)2 = 2(1+σ)
([
a− 5σ +4
4(1+σ)
]2
− 1
4
[
5σ +4
2(1+σ)
]2
+(1+σ)
)
> 0.
If now suffices to show that − 14
[
5σ+4
2(1+σ)
]2
+(1+σ) > 0, but this is true for all σ > 0, hence, the
claim is proven.
The situation σ = 1. It follows that the expression in (13) is non-positive for all a > 1, which
implies that−(αδ+γβ )/(γy−δ )2 ≥ 0 and hence− f2/ f1 is non-decreasing in y≥ 2 for every a> 1
(using the intermezzo). We then have
lim
y→∞−
f2(ay,y,σ)
f1(ay,y,σ)
=
σ(a2−1)
(1+σ)a2− (2σ +1)a+2σ(σ +1) =: h1(a,σ)
and maximizing this function over a ∈ R>1, we find the optimum
a∗(σ) = 1+σ +
√
σ(σ +2). (14)
The situation 1/2≤ σ < 1. More generally, for any σ < 1 it holds that αδ +γβ ≤ 0 if and only
if a /∈ (1+σ ,2). In particular for every a /∈ (1+σ ,2), we can then show that
sup
y≥2
− f2(ay,y,σ)
f1(ay,y,σ)
≤ lim
y→∞−
f2(a∗y,y,σ)
f1(a∗y,y,σ)
(15)
with a∗ as in (14) using the same argument as in the case σ = 1. The intermezzo implies that if the
expression (12) is non-increasing in y, which is the case when a ∈ (1+σ ,2), then the maximum
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value is attained in y= 2. That is, we are interested in the expression− f2(2a,2,σ)/ f1(2a,2,σ), and
in particular, we want to show that the supremum over a ∈ (1+σ ,2) does not exceed the right hand
side of (15), i.e., the supremum over all a /∈ (1+σ ,2).
Because of the discussion in the above, it suffices to study
− f2(2a,2,σ)
f1(2a,2,σ)
=
[(a2−1)σ ]2+[3(1−a)σ ]
[(1+σ)a2− (2σ +1)a+2σ(σ +1)]2− [(2+σ)a+2σ2−2]
=
σ(2a2−3a+1)
2(1+σ)a2− (5σ +4)a+2(1+σ)2 =: h2(a,σ) (16)
for a ∈ (1+σ ,2). This expression, for a > 1, is maximized for b∗(σ) = 1+σ +√σ(σ +1/2),
which in particular gives an upper bound for a ∈ (1+σ ,2)).
It now suffices to show that
∆(σ) := h1(a∗(σ),σ)−h2(b∗(σ),σ)≥ 0,
since this implies that the supremum over a > 1 in (11) is attained at some a /∈ (1+σ ,2). We have
checked this numerically (see Figure 4).
The situation σ > 1. We can use similar reasoning as in the previous case, but now the expres-
sion in (12) is non-increasing for a ∈ (2,1+σ). Note that this does not affect the reasoning in the
previous case, since we maximize over all a > 1 when obtaining b∗(σ). uunionsq
Fig. 4. Numerical verification that h2(b∗(σ),σ)≤ h1(a∗(σ),σ) for 1/2≤ σ ≤ 2 with step size ∆ = 10−6.
The following theorem shows that the bound in Theorem 1 is also a lower bound for general conges-
tion games and arbitrary ρ,σ ≥ 0. We generalize the construction of Christodoulou and Koutsoupias
[6], who showed the lower bound for the classical case ρ = σ = 1. This construction is also used in
the risk-uncertainty model of Nikolova et al. [12], and the altruism model of Chen et al. [5].
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Theorem 8. For ρ, σ ∈R>0 fixed, and players with cost functions Cρi (s), there exist linear conges-
tion games such
Cσ (s)
Cσ (s∗)
≥ 2ρ(1+σ)+1
ρ+1
where s is a Nash equilibrium, and s∗ a socially optimal strategy profile.
Proof. We construct a congestion game of n≥ 3 players and |E|= 2n resources with price of anarchy
greater than or equal to (2ρ(1+σ)+1)/(ρ+1). The set E is divided in the sets E1 = {h1, . . . ,hn}
and E2 = {g1, . . . ,gn}. Player i has two pure strategies: {hi,gi} and {hi+1,gi−1,gi+1}, where the
indices appear as i mod n. The latency functions of the elements in E1 are ce(x) = x, whereas the
latency functions of the elements in E2 are ce(x) = ρx.
Regardless which strategy player i plays, he always uses at least one resource from both E1 and
E2, implying that Cσi (s)≥ ρ+1. This implies that
Cσ (t) = ∑
i∈N
Cσi (s)≥ (ρ+1)n (17)
for every strategy profile t, and in particular for a social optimum s∗.
We will now show that the strategy profile s where every agent i plays its second strategy
{hi+1,gi−1,gi+1} is a Nash equilibrium. We have Cρi (s) = 2ρ[1+ρ(2− 1)]+ 1 = 2ρ2 + 2ρ + 1. If
some agent i deviates to its first strategy s′i, we have C
ρ
i (s
′
i,s−i) = ρ[1+ρ(3−1)]+(1+ρ(2−1)) =
2ρ2+2ρ+1, since there are then three agents using gi and two agents using hi. This shows that s is
a Nash equilibrium. The social cost of this strategy s is
Cσ (s) = n(1+2ρ[1+σ(2−1)]) = (1+2ρ(1+σ))n. (18)
Combining (18) with (17) then gives the desired result. uunionsq
Theorem 3. Let s be a Nash equilibrium under the cost functions Cρi (s) and let s
∗ be a minimizer of
Cσ (·). Then Cσ (s)/Cσ (s∗)≤ ρ+1 for 1≤ 2σ ≤ ρ . Furthermore, this bound is tight.
Proof. We show that
(1+ρ · x)y−ρ(x−1)x− x≤−(1+σ(x−1))x+(1+ρ)(1+σ(y−1))y
and then the result follows from Lemma 1, with h = 1 and g = 1+ρ . Rewriting gives the equivalent
statement
[y+σy(y−1)− xy+ x(x−1)]ρ+σ [y(y−1)− x(x−1)]≥ 0. (19)
We first show that [y+σy(y−1)− xy+ x(x−1)]≥ 0 for all σ ≥ 1/2. If suffices to show this claim
for σ = 1/2, since y(y−1)≥ 0 for all y ∈ N. We have
y+
1
2
y(y−1)− xy+ x(x−1) = 1
2
[(
x− y− 1
2
)2
− 1
4
+ x(x−1)
]
and this last expression is clearly non-negative for all x,y ∈ N (since the quadratic term is always at
least 1/4).
It now suffices to show (19) for ρ = 2σ , since we have shown that the expression is a non-
decreasing affine function of ρ , for every fixed σ ≥ 1/2. Substituting ρ = 2σ and dividing (19) by
σ , we get the equivalent statement
2 [y+σy(y−1)− xy+ x(x−1)]+ [y(y−1)− x(x−1)]≥ 0 (20)
which we will show to be non-negative for all non-negative integers x and y and σ ≥ 1/2. Again, it
suffices to show the statement for σ = 1/2. The statement in (20) is then equivalent to(
x− y− 1
2
)2
− 1
4
+ y(y−1)
which is clearly non-negative for all x,y ∈ N.
The tightness can be obtained by considering the following game on four resources with two
players. Player A has strategies {{1},{2,4}} and player B has strategies {{2},{1,3}}. Resources e=
1,2 have cost function ce(x) = x and resources e = 3,4 have cost function ce(x) = ρx. The optimum
s∗ = ({1},{2}) has cost 2, whereas the Nash equilibrium s = ({2,4},{1,3} has cost 2(1+ρ). uunionsq
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C Omitted Material of Section 4
Lemma 2. For all non-negative integers x and y, and σ ≥ 0, we have(
x− y+ 1
2
)2
− 1
4
+2σx(x−1)+(
√
σ(σ +2)+σ)[y(y−1)− x(x−1)]≥ 0.
Proof. The inequality is clearly true for all y≥ x, so we assume that y < x. Rewriting the expression
gives
(1+σ+
√
σ(σ +2))y2−2xy+(1+σ−
√
σ(σ +2))x2−(1+σ+
√
σ(σ +2))y+(1−σ+
√
σ(σ +2))x≥ 0.
Multiplying with 1+σ −√σ(σ +2), which is non-negative for all σ ≥ 0, gives
y2−2
(
1+σ −
√
σ(σ +2)
)
xy+
(
1+σ −
√
σ(σ +2)
)2
x2− y
+ (1+σ −
√
σ(σ +2))(1−σ +
√
σ(σ +2))x ≥ 0,
using the fact that (1+σ +
√
σ(σ +2))(1+σ −√σ(σ +2)) = 1. This is equivalent to((
1+σ −
√
σ(σ +2)
)
x− y+ 1
2
)2
+
(
1+σ −
√
σ(σ +2)
)
([1+σ−
√
σ(σ +2) ]−1)x− 1
4
≥ 0.
We now substitute c = 1+σ −√σ(σ +2)≥ 0 in order to obtain the equivalent formulation(
c · x− y+ 1
2
)2
+ c(1− c)x− 1
4
≥ 0 (21)
for 0≤ c < 1, since the function c(σ) = 1+σ −√σ(σ +2) is bijective from R to [0,1). For x = 0,
the inequality reduces to ( 12 − y)2 − 1/4 ≥ 0 which is true for all y ∈ N. For x = 1, we get the
equivalent formulation
(y−1)(y−2c)≥ 0,
which is clearly true for y = 1. For y = 0, it follows from the fact that c ≥ 0. For y ≥ 2 if follows
from the fact that y−2c≥ 0 for all y≥ 2, since 0≤ c < 1. This completes the case x = 1.
For x≥ 2, we rewrite the expression (21) to
x(x−1)c2+2x(1− y)c+ y(y−1)≥ 0 (22)
If y = 0, the expression in (22) is clearly non-negative for all x ≥ 2 and 0 ≤ c < 1. For y ≥ 1, note
that g(c) = x(x−1)c2 +2x(1− y)c+ y(y−1) is a quadratic and convex function for all fixed x and
y. Therefore, in particular, for any x and y fixed, it suffices to show that the inequality holds for the
minimizer of g, which is c∗ = (y−1)/(x−1) (which can be found by differentiating with respect to
c). Note that 0≤ c∗ < 1 by our assumption that y≥ 1 and y < x (made in the beginning of the proof).
Substituting implies that it suffices to show that
x(x−1)(y−1)2
(x−1)2 +
2x(1− y)(y−1)
x−1 + y(y−1)≥ 0.
Multiplying the expression with (x−1) implies that it now suffices to show that
x(y−1)2−2x(y−1)2+ y(y−1)(x−1)≥ 0
for all 1≤ y < x. This is always true since
x(y−1)2−2x(y−1)2+ y(y−1)(x−1) = −x(y−1)2+ y(y−1)(x−1)
= (y−1) [−x(y−1)+ y(x−1)]
= (y−1)(x− y)
≥ 0
whenever 1≤ y < x. This completes the proof. uunionsq
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The bound of 2 on the price of stability for generalized affine congestion games requires some
additional arguments: The bound in Theorem 4 with ρ = σ is only valid for σ ≥ 1/4 (because
otherwise the lower bound on ρ is not satisfied). Nevertheless for 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1/4, the corresponding
cost functions ce(x) = σx+(1−σ) have non-negative constants and thus the price of stability for
classical congestion games applies here. That is, we have
PoS(A′) = max
{
1.577, sup
σ≥1/4
{
1+
√
σ/(σ +2)
}}
= 2.
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D Omitted Material of Section 5
Theorem 6. Let H be a collection of congestion games. If PoA(H,1,2) = 1, then PoA(H,1,ρ) is
non-increasing function for 1≤ ρ ≤ 2.
Proof. Let α = ρ−1. Suppose that PoA(H,1,α) =: PoA(α) is not non-increasing, then there exist
x < y∈ [0,1] such that PoA(y)> PoA(x). We also know, by assumption, that PoA(x)≥ PoA(1) = 1,
since the price of anarchy is always lower bounded by 1 (note that this also implies that y 6= 1). This
means that
max{PoA(x),PoA(1)}< PoA(y).
However, if we write y = γ · x+(1− γ) ·1 for some γ ∈ [0,1], then Theorem 10.2 [5] implies that
PoA(y)≤max{PoA(x),PoA(1)}
which is a contradiction. uunionsq
E Omitted Material of Section 5.1
Theorem 7. Let Γ be a symmetric network congestion game with linear cost functions, then
PoS(Γ ,ρ,1)≤
4/(ρ(4−ρ)) if 0≤ ρ ≤ 14/(2+ρ) if 1≤ ρ ≤ 2
(2+ρ)/4 if 2≤ ρ < ∞
In particular, if Γ is a symmetric congestion game on an extenstion-parallel 15 graph G, then the
upper bounds even hold for the price of anarchy. All bounds are tight.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 7. We will refer to strategy profiles
as flows, since we can interpret symmetric network congestion games as a flow problem in which
players each have to route one unit of unsplittable flow from a given source to a given target. To be
precise, for a graph G = (V,E) and given s, t ∈V , we write P for the set of all simple s, t-paths (the
common strategy set of the players). We denote fP as the number of players using path P ∈ P . We
call f a feasible (unsplittable) flow if ∑P∈P fP = N, and with fe we denote the number of players
using edge e ∈ E, that is, fe = ∑P∈P:e∈P fP.
We use the following result due to Fotakis [9].
Lemma 4 (Fotakis [9]). Let Γ be a congestion game with cost functions de, and let Φ be an exact
potential for Γ . An acyclic flow f minimizes the potential function Φ if and only if
∑
e: fe>ge
( fe−ge)de( fe)− ∑
e: fe<ge
(ge− fe)de( fe+1)≤ 0
for every feasible flow g.
The following lemma gives inefficiency results for global minima of the potential function Φ
(compared to any feasible flow). Since the local minima of Φ correspond to the Nash equilibria of
the game Γ , it follows that the global minima of Φ are Nash equilibria. Furthermore, Fotakis [9]
shows that every Nash equilibrium of a symmetric congestion game on an extension-parallel graph
is a global minimum of the potential function Φ . In particular, this means that the ineffiency results
in Lemma 5 hold for the price of stability of symmetric network congestion games, and the price of
anarchy of symmetric extension-parallel congestion games.
Lemma 5. Let Γ be a congestion game with cost functions de(x) = ae(1+ρ(x−1)), and let Φ be
an exact potential for Γ . Let f be an acyclic flow minimizing the potential function Φ , then
Cσ ( f ) ≤ ∑
fe>ge
ae [( fe−1)(ρge+(σ −ρ) fe)+ge]
+ ∑
fe≤ge
ae [( fe−1)(ρge+(σ −ρ) fe)+(1+ρ)ge−ρ fe] .
15 A graph G is extension parallel if it consists of either (i) a single edge, (ii) a single edge and an extension-
parallel graph composed in series, (iii) two extension-parallel graphs composed in parallel.
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Furthermore, if h(ρ,σ)< 1 satisfies,
(x−1)(ρy+(σ −ρ)x)+ y≤ h(ρ,σ) · x[1+σ(x−1)]+g(ρ,σ) · y[1+σ(y−1)] (23)
for all non-negative integers x > y, and
(x−1)(ρy+(σ −ρ)x)+(1+ρ)y−ρx≤ h(ρ,σ) ·x[1+σ(x−1)]+g(ρ,σ) ·y[1+σ(y−1)] (24)
for all non-negative integers x≤ y, then Cσ ( f )/Cσ (g)≤ g(ρ,σ)/(1−h(ρ,σ)).
Proof. We write de(x) = ae[1+σ(x− 1)] + ae[(ρ −σ)(x− 1)] in the left summation, and obtain,
using Lemma 4,
∑
fe>ge
feae[1+σ( fe−1)] ≤ ∑
fe>ge
ae (ge[1+ρ( fe−1)]+ fe(σ −ρ)( fe−1))
+ ∑
fe<ge
(ge− fe)ae(1+ρ fe).
Applying the inequality, we find
Cσ ( f ) = ∑
fe>ge
feae[1+σ( fe−1)]+ ∑
fe<ge
feae[1+σ( fe−1)]+ ∑
fe=ge
feae[1+σ( fe−1)]
≤ ∑
fe>ge
ae [( fe−1)(ρge+(σ −ρ) fe)+ge]
+ ∑
fe<ge
ae [( fe−1)(ρge+(σ −ρ) fe)+(1+ρ)ge−ρ fe]+ ∑
fe=ge
feae[1+σ( fe−1)]
= ∑
fe>ge
ae [( fe−1)(ρge+(σ −ρ) fe)+ge]
+ ∑
fe≤ge
ae [( fe−1)(ρge+(σ −ρ) fe)+(1+ρ)ge−ρ fe]
This completes the proof. uunionsq
We continue the proof of the upper bounds in Theorem 7 by showing the result in the statement
for 0 < ρ ≤ 1, that is, we define
h(ρ,1) = 1−ρ+ρ2/4 and g(ρ,1) = 1
and prove the correctness of the resulting inequalities in (23) and (24) (see Lemma 6). The cases
1 ≤ ρ ≤ 2 and 2 ≤ ρ ≤ ∞ follow (indirectly) from Caragiannis et al. [4].16 The authors use a sim-
ilar approach as here, but only show the inequality in Lemma 4 for Nash equilibria of symmetric
singleton congestion games. Nevertheless, the remainder of the analysis carries over to our model.
Lemma 6. For any integers x,y≥ 0 and any ρ ∈ (0,1] we have, when x < y,
ρ · xy+(y− x)≤ ρ
2
4
x2+ y2,
and, when x≥ y,
ρ · xy+(1−ρ)(y− x)+(1−ρ)x2 ≤
(
1−ρ+ ρ
2
4
)
x2+ y2.
16 The model of Carigiannis et al. [4] is equivalent to our model under the transformation ρ = 1/(1−ζ ), where
ζ is the model parameter of [4]. That is, the range 1 ≤ ρ ≤ 2 corresponds to ζ ∈ [0,1/2], and the range
2≤ ρ ≤ ∞ to ζ ∈ [1/2,1).
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Proof. Let y = x+ z, where z is a positive integer. Then we have
f (x,y) =
ρ2
4
x2+ y2−ρxy− (y− x)
=
ρ2
4
x2+(x2+2xz+ z2)−ρx(x+ z)− z
=
(
ρ2
4
+1−ρ
)
x2+(2−ρ)xz+ z(z−1)
≥ 0,
since ρ ∈ (0,1], x≥ 0 and z > 0.
For the second inequality, it suffices to show that
g(x,y) =
ρ2
4
x2+ y2−ρxy− (ρ−1)(x− y)≥ 0
which can be seen by leaving out the term (1−ρ)x2 on both sides of the inequality. We first treat the
case y = 0. Then
g(x,0) =
ρ2
4
x2+(1−ρ)x≥ 0
since x≥ 0 and ρ ∈ (0,1]. For y≥ 1, we write a = x/y (for sake of notation). We have
g(x,y) =
ρ2
4
x2+ y2−ρxy− (ρ−1)(x− y)
=
ρ2
4
a2y2+ y2−ρay2+(1−ρ)(ay− y)
=
[
(ρa)2
4
−ρa+1
]
y2+(1−ρ)(a−1)y
=
[ρa
2
−1
]2
y2+(1−ρ)(a−1)y
=
[
ρx
2y
−1
]2
y2+(1−ρ)
(
x
y
−1
)
y
≥ 0,
since ρ ∈ (0,1], y≥ 1 and a≥ 1. uunionsq
It remains to show tightness of the resulting bounds. For 1 ≤ ρ ≤ 2, consider an instance with
two players and two resources with resp. cost functions c1(x) = x and c2(x) = (1+ρ + ε)x where
0 < ε  ρ . Then the unique Nash equilibrium is given by (x1,x2) = (2,0), and the social optimum
by (x∗1,x
∗
2) = (1,1). Sending ε → 0 gives the desired bound of 4/(2+ρ).
For 2≤ ρ ≤ ∞, we can use the same instance as the for 1≤ ρ ≤ 2, with the only difference that
c2(x) = (1+ ρ − ε)x. Then the social optimum is given by (x∗1,x∗2) = (2,0) and the unique Nash
equilibrium by (x1,x2) = (1,1).
For the case 0 < ρ ≤ 1, the lower bound is technically more involved.
Lemma 7. For every fixed (rational) 0 < ρ ≤ 1, and ε > 0, there exists a symmetric singleton con-
gestion game for which the price of stability is greater than 4/(ρ(4−ρ))− ε .
Proof. We choose values of n and i so that
ρ =
i
n−1
where, without loss of generality, we may assume that i is even. We will construct a congestion game
with n agents and 1+(n− i/2) resources. We let c0(x) = x and for e ∈ {1, . . . ,n− i/2} we define
ce(x) = [(1−ρ)+ρn+ ε]x = [1+ i+ ε]x, with 0 < ε  ρ.
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A socially optimal profile s∗ is given by x∗0 = i/2 and x
∗
e = 1 for e ∈ {1, . . . ,n− i/2}, resulting in
SC(s∗) =
(
i
2
)2
+
(
n− i
2
)
(1+ i+ ε)
=
ρ2
4
(n−1)2+
(
n− 1
2
ρ(n−1)
)
[(1−ρ)+ρn+ ε]
=
ρ2
4
(n2−2n+1)+
(
(1− ρ
2
)n+
ρ
2
)
[(1−ρ)+ρn+ ε]
=
[
ρ2
4
+ρ(1− ρ
2
)
]
n2+
[
−ρ
2
2
+(1−ρ+ ε)(1− ρ
2
)+
ρ2
2
]
n+
ρ2
4
+
ρ
2
(1−ρ+ ε)
=
[
ρ
(
1− ρ
4
)]
n2+
[
(1−ρ+ ε)(1− ρ
2
)
]
n+
ρ
2
(
1− ρ
2
+ ε
)
The unique Nash equilibrium is given by the strategy profile s for which x0 = n and xe = 0 for
e ∈ {1, . . . ,n− i/2}, since the perceived cost on resource e = 0 is then precisely (1−ρ)+ρn, so
no player can strictly improve its (perceived) cost by deviating to one of the other resources, which
have cost (1−ρ)+ρn+ ε . The social cost of this equilibrium is n2, which implies that
C1(s)
C1(s∗)
=
n2[
ρ
(
1− ρ4
)]
n2+
[
(1−ρ)(1− ρ2 + ε)
]
n+ ρ2
(
1− ρ2 + ε
) → 1
ρ (1−ρ/4)
as n→ ∞ (note that this also means that i→ ∞ since ρ is fixed). uunionsq
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